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Chairman: Mr. MacKay ..... (New Zealand)
Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions: Mr. Kuznetsov

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The meeting was called to order at 9.40 a.m.

Agenda item 108: Programme budget for the biennium 2004-2005 (*continued*)

Strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations (A/59/365 and Corr.1, and Add.1 and Corr.1, A/59/396 and A/59/539)

1. **Mr. Al-Ansari** (Qatar), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said that, in the past, the Group had already emphasized the importance of a comprehensive approach to the safety of United Nations personnel which should produce lasting solutions and that the Administration and the staff must work hand in hand to that end. In order to find effective solutions, it was necessary to establish clear criteria for determining security needs; agree on a framework for the enhancement of security arrangements throughout the United Nations system; decide on precise and realistic time frames for the completion of projects approved by the General Assembly; clearly define lines of accountability and the chain of command right down to those working in the field; clearly define the role and responsibilities of host countries and the status of agreements between them and the United Nations; establish precise global standards for threat and risk assessment; and provide security training for all United Nations staff.

2. The Group of 77 and China considered that the host Government bore the primary responsibility for the safety of personnel. They concurred with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) that the arrangements made with the United Nations were inadequate, since the responsibilities and obligations of the host countries were not always laid down in a legally binding document. They also endorsed the Advisory Committee's view that not all host countries were able to ensure the same level of protection for United Nations staff and premises.

3. The organizations in the United Nations system must pursue their efforts to coordinate security. In that respect, the inter-agency cost-sharing arrangement approved in General Assembly resolution 56/255 should be further developed.

4. **Mr. van der Berg** (Netherlands), speaking on behalf of the European Union, the candidate countries Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey, the countries of the stabilization and association process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro, drew attention to the fact that three election monitors had recently been abducted in Afghanistan and said that the United Nations security strategy and structures should be reviewed, so that the Organization could carry out all its mandates, while at the same time mitigating risks without adopting a bunker mentality. It was necessary to increase the number of field security staff, enhance threat assessment and risk analysis capabilities, monitor more rigorously compliance with minimum operating security standards and improve training, within a coordinated approach. Care must be taken to establish clear reporting lines, especially in complex missions where each agency had its own security staff, and to ensure the transparency of security expenditures throughout the United Nations system.

5. The creation of a Directorate of Security as part of a strengthened and unified system should make it possible to manage security in a sound, coherent manner at Headquarters, at all other duty stations and in the field. The European Union was pleased to note the proposal to designate in each country just one official to oversee all the security services and to establish a single reporting line up to the head of the Directorate of Security. It likewise welcomed proposals to tighten security measures at the main duty stations.

6. In its comments on the staffing of the new Directorate, the Advisory Committee was proposing to remove a number of what the European Union considered to be key middle management positions. However, it shared the Advisory Committee's doubts about the working relationship between the new Directorate, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations with respect to assessing threats and monitoring compliance with the minimum operating security standards. In that connection, it wished to know what conclusions had been reached by the field security management audit conducted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and hoped that those conclusions had been taken into account in the current report.

7. The European Union also wished to explore in greater depth the idea of making the Directorate of Security responsible for personnel recruitment and procurement. It welcomed the reassurance that the

proposed standby stock would not constitute a separate logistics base. It would like to be able to compare the respective advantages of the Advisory Committee's recommendation — that no additional personnel should be assigned to administrative support units and that the latter should continue to be split between four separate departments — with the Secretary-General's proposal. It also hoped that other options for increasing training opportunities would be explored.

8. The construction work to secure compliance with the minimum operating security standards at headquarters locations should be examined in the light of the report of OIOS on the utilization and management of appropriations and expenditure authorized by the General Assembly for that work ($56 million and $38 million respectively). The European Union noted that the Secretary-General had called on outside specialists, but that priorities had not been defined and long delays had occurred, especially in Geneva, a point which had been emphasized by OIOS and the Advisory Committee. It required reassurance that, when funds were requested for urgent work, they really were committed with urgency.

9. The European Union sought clarification on the implications of the Capital Master Plan for the proposed global access control system and information and communications technology (ICT) disaster recovery and business continuity plans at Headquarters.

10. The European Union took note of the Advisory Committee's views regarding cost-sharing arrangements. Since, as a matter of principle, the financing of security must be certain and predictable, all organizations should honour their obligations for the co-financing of security in New York and Vienna.

11. **Mr. Rastam** Mohd Isa (Malaysia) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement made by the representative of Qatar on behalf of the Group of 77 and China. It agreed with the Secretary-General's assessment of increasing risks. Attacks were no longer isolated events and were often carried out by non-State actors who respected neither the rules of war nor the rule of law. Security had become a constant concern of United Nations staff dispensing emergency humanitarian assistance or engaged in the performance of other mandates.

12. His delegation welcomed the fact that the General Assembly had authorized an additional appropriation to finance the first series of security measures and it approved of the reforms proposed by the Secretary-General with a view to creating a single unified management system comprising a Directorate of Security, provided that a clear line of authority was defined. Like the Advisory Committee, it hoped that the proposed unified security structure would result in genuine integration rather than merely enhanced coordination and that it would make it possible to avoid duplication and potentially dangerous confusion. It also agreed with the Advisory Committee that the future Director of Security must have the requisite skills and professional experience.

13. His delegation had taken note of the Secretary-General's proposal to phase out the existing cost-sharing arrangements and of the Advisory Committee's observations on the subject. That issue must be closely scrutinized so that agreement could be reached quickly on a financial arrangement to enable the immediate establishment of the new integrated system.

14. His Government called on Member States to continue their collaboration with the United Nations in order to ensure the safety of the Organization's personnel, especially during peacekeeping and peace-building operations. His country, which hosted a few United Nations agencies, would honour its obligations in that regard.

15. **Mr. Kennedy** (United States of America) said that the Secretary-General and the Member States had a shared responsibility to protect the staff of the Organization, and that the United States had consistently supported the creation of a robust security system. However, the security challenge in the field and the inconsistent application of United Nations security measures had always been a problem for the Organization. Since 1992, 220 United Nations staff members from 66 different countries had been killed and 272 had been taken hostage, three of them recently in Afghanistan.

16. The General Assembly had taken a first step in June 2004 by voting a supplementary appropriation that would provide more resources for security. The Secretary-General, with the help of outside security consultants and the expert advice of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel (the Ahtisaari panel), had proposed a comprehensive, integrated security structure that would take the form of a new department within the

Secretariat; it was the most important proposal he had ever made to the General Assembly. The new department would have responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of approximately 400,000 persons around the world, its activities would be wide-ranging and it would have the capacity to ensure security at all times in every location where the United Nations was present.

17. That unified structure, in contrast to the currently fragmented system, would provide sufficient flexibility to redirect resources, both post and non-post, as needed to manage crises globally. Headed by an Under-Secretary-General, the Directorate of Security would lay a solid foundation and establish clear lines of accountability for decision-making at all levels. Within the Directorate, the Threat and Risk Analysis Unit, which would be in direct touch, through regional desk officers and field security coordinators at all duty stations and missions, with situations on the ground, would provide the Organization with the capacity to respond consistently to situations as they arose locally, be in control of the decisions taken and avoid waste and duplication.

18. His delegation welcomed the proposal to increase the United Nations security presence in the field, which would remedy a fundamental failing of the Organization for some years, a situation due primarily to the paucity of resources made available to the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator. Host nations bore a significant responsibility for security matters, given the multiplicity of the dangers threatening United Nations personnel, but the Organization could not always depend on a host nation's support and, furthermore, had to preserve its own independence by not ceding its internal security responsibilities to anyone else.

19. **Mr. Aboul Atta** (Egypt) said that his country, which attached huge importance to the security of United Nations personnel, had always believed that the best way to enhance security was to strengthen the Organization's image of neutrality in its various areas of intervention, especially in an international climate marked by deep suspicion between the different participants in multilateral action. Both the Secretariat and Member States had to concern themselves with that aspect of the question and should especially reinforce the relevant activities of the Department of Information. The report of the Secretary-General (A/59/365 and Corr.1) outlining the proposed new security management system prompted his delegation to comment on four points. First, the question of the safety and security of United Nations staff should be approached in a comprehensive and integrated way, on the basis of clear and consistent criteria and precise technical studies. It was not enough to allocate funds and create posts, and there was no room for experimentation in the area of security. It would therefore be interesting to know how the Secretariat had followed up on the General Assembly's requests in paragraph 6 of resolution 58/295, because Member States needed to be adequately informed if they were to take informed decisions on the proposals being submitted to them. As ACABQ had observed, the report of the Secretary-General was not clear about the basic principles and underlying assumptions or the technical standards relied upon to formulate those proposals.

20. Secondly, there was the risk that a new security management system would be set up even as different security structures remained in place, causing ambiguity and preventing the proposed system from clearly defining the lines of command and accountability. The attack on the United Nations premises in Baghdad, in which two Egyptians had died, had unique features that could not be expected to apply in all regions of the world but, thanks to the Ahtisaari report, the event had served to highlight the many shortcomings of security management in the Organization. It was therefore important for any new system to address the problem of those structural shortcomings and establish clear lines of command and accountability.

21. Thirdly, the host countries assumed responsibilities and obligations that had to be clearly defined when it came to the security of United Nations personnel and premises. It would therefore be advisable for the Secretariat to review and update its headquarters agreements with host countries or to conclude such agreements where there were none.

22. Fourthly, the entire international community was in agreement about the political and humanitarian importance of the subject under consideration, and about the general principles that should guide the deliberations. The Committee should therefore ensure that a security structure that was both effective and flexible was set up at Headquarters, without any overlap or bureaucracy. It should also satisfy itself that emphasis was being put on strengthening security in

the field. The paucity of proposed security funds for peacekeeping operations was consequently surprising, as was the absence of any reference to security appropriations in the individual peacekeeping budgets. Under the circumstances, the Committee should make a detailed financial analysis of the resources requested to ascertain if they corresponded to real needs and could not be used for purposes other than security. The Committee should also strike a good balance between judicious allocation of resources and a concern for the best possible results by addressing also recruitment and training policies that would afford the new system the most competent possible staff. Lastly, it must make sure that security measures had the support of both management and staff, and that any new initiative or proposal was backed by detailed technical studies and was approved by Member States, at the same time taking account of similar initiatives or projects and their compatibility with the United Nations Capital Master Plan.

23. His delegation endorsed the statement made by the representative of Qatar on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, in particular concerning the cost-sharing system, the need to ensure that the budgetary appropriations allocated to the new security management system were not drawn from those allocated to the funding of other programmes, and the need for an objective, impartial assessment of the threats and dangers in host countries, in coordination with their competent authorities. Both the Secretariat and Member States were making laudable efforts to strengthen the security of United Nations staff and premises; they must do that in partnership, coming to an agreement on judicious, effective measures and their funding.

24. **Mr. Zhang** Yishan (China), endorsing the statement of the representative of Qatar, said that he wished to make some comments on financial implications. He was pleased with the report of the Secretary-General on a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations, a matter of paramount importance.

25. His delegation hoped that the proposed new Directorate of Security would prove to be an efficient department, with a lean staff and a simple organizational structure in which lines of accountability were clearly defined. There should be a well-defined division of labour in the three proposed Divisions within the Directorate and they should work according to the principle of accountability. The Secretary-General was proposing a total of 190 additional posts, 88 of which were Security Service posts. His delegation believed that an increase in the number of Security Service posts was in order, so as to have more of a balance with the administrative support posts, and it asked the Secretariat to explain what functions the new posts entailed in order to help delegations assess the need for them.

26. The observations and recommendations of the Advisory Committee in its report (A/59/539) on the report of the Secretary-General were most helpful. His delegation noted with particular interest the ACABQ suggestion that the new Under-Secretary-General post for the head of the proposed Directorate of Security should be offset by abolishing the existing Assistant Secretary-General post. Member States had already appropriated security resources amounting to $173,809,300, $68,528,500 of which were for posts and $46,270,900 for improvement of premises. The additional requirements of $97,074,200 sought by the Secretary-General would increase the total security resources to $270,883,500, including the addition of 744 new posts and 34 conversions. His delegation would review the Secretary-General's proposal carefully.

27. The current cost-sharing arrangements reflected well the shared responsibilities of all participating agencies of the United Nations system and should therefore be maintained. It should be emphasized that at every duty station, including United Nations Headquarters, the host country was responsible for providing the necessary protection outside the perimeter of the United Nations premises, and the Secretariat had to collaborate more closely with host countries on that point.

28. **Mr. Ugarte** (Costa Rica) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement made by the representative of Qatar on behalf of the Group of 77 and China. The staff of the Organization and their families must be able to count on a modern and effective security system. The tragic events which had given rise to the debate made protection an absolute priority for the Secretary-General and Member States. Consideration of the issue must lead to structured, effective, rational and responsible measures.

29. His delegation welcomed the recommendations of the Advisory Committee (A/59/539) and noted that the

security-related projects introduced in recent years had not been part of a comprehensive strategy aimed at reducing the vulnerability of the Organization's staff and infrastructure to acts of terrorism. It believed that the recommendations of the Secretary-General (A/59/365 and A/59/365/Add.1) contained concrete elements which might provide a starting point for an in-depth study, but regretted that they were selective in approach and lacked a basic framework, workload statistics and information regarding the extent to which requests for equipment and materiel were based on objective technical standards. As for a possible worldwide approach to the security programme, the resources allocated should be used for security in the field rather than for headquarters locations.

30. In order to eliminate a disturbing problem, the Organization must conclude legally binding contracts with host countries which were largely responsible for security, contracts that clearly defined the responsibilities of the Governments concerned and the mechanisms for cooperation between them and the offices established in their territory. That would make it possible to utilize data based on experience and resources rationally, improve planning and reduce expenses.

31. Standardized job descriptions for security personnel, particularly in the Professional and higher levels, the staffing table, the areas of responsibility and opportunities for the transparent and rational reassignment of staff must be clearly defined. To do so, the Organization must use the human resources management tools already at its disposal. The proposal to establish a Directorate of Security required further explanation. Rather than providing such an entity with independent support units, it would be preferable to integrate it into the existing structure. Duplication must be avoided.

32. With regard to information and communications technology security, his delegation supported the principle of a review of needs prior to the acquisition of material and the recruitment of staff, and it hoped that available resources would be used. The global access control system should be studied in detail and duly justified, and should be part of the comprehensive security strategy, along with studies on vulnerability and risk evaluation, which must be staggered so that the recommendations arising therefrom could be funded in a rational manner. The current cost-sharing system should be maintained. The inclusion of all costs in the regular budget would, in fact, have implications for national budgets.

33. Member States must act in a responsible and transparent manner and refrain from entering into commitments that they could not honour. Costs relating to the security project were enormous for countries such as Costa Rica, which welcomed any proposal aimed at reducing the amounts needed. Member States would endeavour to provide financial support for the launching of the process aimed at strengthening security within the Organization. The Secretariat should submit a comprehensive strategic framework and make a particular effort to avoid any further delays or gaps in the planning and management of projects. The budgetary obligations of the Organization were greater than Member States' capacity to pay and any new proposal must therefore be reviewed in depth.

34. **Mr. Abbas** (Pakistan) supported the statement made by the representative of Qatar on behalf of the Group of 77 and China and paid tribute to the staff members who had lost their lives in the line of duty. Given the large number of staff members, peacekeepers, United Nations Volunteers and humanitarian personnel working in hazardous conditions, it was the right time to look into the future security requirements of the Organization systematically. As the largest troop-contributing country, Pakistan attached great importance to the strengthening of the safety and security of United Nations personnel and premises. Pakistan had lost 82 peacekeepers, including 15 in air accidents, and hoped that the issue of air safety would be given high priority under the new security management system.

35. His delegation took note of the progress made in the first phase of the security reforms and endorsed the Secretary-General's proposal that the disparate elements of a defective, fragmented and excessively complex system should be amalgamated into one cohesive entity. It hoped that the new unified management system would restore the confidence of the staff, which had been shattered after the tragic incident in Baghdad, and he was convinced that Member States would take all appropriate measures to meet the Organization's security needs. He agreed that the new unified Directorate of Security should be headed by a competent professional at the Under-Secretary-General level.

36. His delegation attached great importance to ensuring the protection of United Nations staff and premises around the world, but believed that the new system should focus primarily on operations in the field, where vulnerability and risk were the greatest, without neglecting the needs of the headquarters locations. System-wide policies, procedures and standards relating to field and headquarters needs should be developed and security staff should be trained accordingly. He expressed great concern that the Organization had generally been unable to finalize security arrangements with host Governments, which bore the primary responsibility for the security of personnel. The Organization must work closely with national law enforcement authorities; that would ensure the protection of the United Nations staff and premises and also reduce costs.

37. His delegation noted the Secretary-General's proposal regarding the phasing out of the current system of cost-sharing which was administratively cumbersome and dependent on voluntary contributions that were by definition unpredictable. The system of cost-sharing could, however, be made more effective through regular coordination and consultation with the participating agencies. In that connection, he noted the comments and recommendations of the Advisory Committee. The financial situation of the Organization had been unstable for several years and there did not appear to be any hope of a dramatic improvement unless the Member States most in default paid their arrears without further delay. The existing cost-sharing arrangements should, however, be maintained; that would reduce costs and deepen the sense of collective responsibility. The Secretariat should therefore submit to the Committee a report on inter-agency coordination with a view to promoting collective responsibility for enhanced security. His delegation supported the Secretary-General's reform package and hoped that the Committee would expeditiously finalize the second phase of security measures in the light of the views and recommendations of the Advisory Committee.

38. **Mr. Geete** (India) said that his delegation aligned itself with the statement made by the representative of Qatar on behalf of the Group of 77 and China. Replying to the Secretary-General's comment that the United Nations had been perceived as a neutral, benevolent actor for the first half-century of its existence (A/59/365), he said that the greatest contribution that the Organization could make to its own security was honest self-criticism. He warned against the notion that money and posts could buy security. Moreover, it had become clear that the attack in Baghdad was partly attributable to non-adherence to security regulations and directives. The two principles relating to the security of the Organization must be adherence to basic regulations and directives and the strict enforcement of accountability.

39. His delegation placed the utmost importance on the safety and security of United Nations staff and premises. In paragraph 30 of his report, the Secretary-General acknowledged that the United Nations system did not have the ability to conduct security threat and risk assessments or timely and comprehensive follow-on planning. He recalled the piecemeal approach described by the Advisory Committee in paragraph 15 of its report (A/59/539). The unified security management system, mentioned by the Secretary-General in document A/58/756 had characteristics that did not suggest an integrated structure: the potential for duplication in that a separate unit of the Directorate of Security would be located within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, while the specialized agencies and United Nations funds and programmes would continue to ask for separate appropriations to finance their own structures.

40. In the absence of genuine integration, neither the reclassification of posts nor the creation of additional management tiers would improve security, nor would assigning to the Directorate of Security posts that already existed in the Budget Office and the Procurement Division. It had been clear that the most pressing need was for security personnel in field locations. However, out of the 778 posts requested, nearly 400 were proposed for Headquarters and the other main offices, with over 200 posts being proposed for New York, Geneva and Vienna alone. On the other hand, no new resources had been proposed for peacekeeping operations, on the grounds that they had benefited under phase I, despite the fact that new operations had been launched and existing operations had been expanded. His delegation would like information on that matter.

41. Most host country agreements, many of which had been drawn up as early as 1946, had never been updated and did not specify the exact responsibilities of those countries vis-à-vis the safety and security of United Nations personnel and premises. In some cases, those agreements were not in the form of legally

binding documents. The Secretary-General's report made no mention of what he proposed to do to ensure that host countries assumed their responsibilities. His delegation strongly supported the Advisory Committee's recommendation regarding cost-sharing (A/59/539). The problems cited to justify the proposal to do away with the existing arrangements could be overcome through better inter-agency coordination; the retention of cost-sharing would encourage a sense of common ownership and favour a move towards a truly unified structure.

42. In view of the financial implications of the Secretary-General's proposals — approximately $300 million over each of the coming two bienniums (nearly 10 per cent of the regular budget of the United Nations) — the continuing nature of the resources sought, and the system-wide nature of the appropriations, his delegation suggested that a separate account should be established for the financing of security. That would enable the General Assembly to monitor more effectively appropriations, which were currently spread over many sections of the budget, and the payment of assessed contributions. Contrary to what the Secretary-General had indicated, the President of the Coordinating Committee of the International Staff Unions and Associations of the United Nations, in her statement on 28 October, had levelled serious criticism at the proposals and had stated that the restructuring of the security management system had been undertaken without consultation with staff representatives.

43. **Mr. Kumalo** (South Africa) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement made by the representative of Qatar on behalf of the Group of 77 and China. An attack against the United Nations was an attack on the collective efforts of Member States to promote peace and to improve the living conditions of the most unfortunate. The General Assembly had repeatedly condemned attacks on the personnel and property of the United Nations; those words must now be backed by actions. Member States had a collective responsibility for the safety of the brave and committed staff members, some of whom had sacrificed their lives for the Organization.

44. The insecurity of persons whose basic needs were not met could become a serious cause of instability and conflict. The United Nations must maintain a presence in the field to assist them. Member States must, however, ensure that staff members were able to perform their tasks in a secure environment, and should take that obligation into consideration in the Organization's support budget.

45. When considering the budget outline for the biennium 2006-2007, it was important for Member States to recognize that, in order to ensure a unified security management system and to improve security for special political missions and peacekeeping operations, the budget level could not remain unchanged. Despite the budgetary constraints of recent years, the United Nations had never ceased to serve Member States. It was imperative that they should provide the necessary resources for the coming biennium, in view of the expansion of mandates and the need to protect the Organization's personnel and premises. Whether or not the United Nations was able to fulfil its mission without resorting to extrabudgetary funds depended on the political support of Member States. His delegation recognized that the protection of United Nations personnel and premises was the responsibility of host Governments, but it believed that those with insufficient resources should be helped. During the informal consultations, it would seek clarifications regarding the Secretary-General's proposals and the impact of the Advisory Committee's recommendations.

46. **Mr. Al-Eryani** (Yemen) said that his delegation supported the statement made by the representative of Qatar on behalf of the Group of 77 and China. Until recently, the United Nations and its staff had been sheltered from wars, and spared from the kind of attacks that occurred in conflict situations in many parts of the world. In word and in deed, the Organization had been, and continued to be, the impartial mediator in such conflicts, whether or not they were violent. Regrettably, however, things had changed and many staff members had been killed by persons who feared neither God nor man in various war and conflict zones.

47. The peoples of the world were aware of the importance of the United Nations and of its role. The danger, however, was real and the time had come to grapple with ways of protecting the Organization and its staff. His delegation welcomed the proposals contained in the reports of the Secretary-General regarding the establishment of a stronger and more unified security management system for all those who worked for the Organization. How could the United

Nations establish peace and security in the world if its own agents were not secure?

48. **Mr. Requeijo Gual** (Cuba) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement made by the representative of Qatar on behalf of the Group of 77 and China. His Government attached great importance to the protection and security of United Nations staff and premises, and supported the adoption of measures that would enable it to improve its activities under acceptable security conditions. His delegation was aware that the Organization's staff was its most valuable asset and that motivated and respected staff members were in a better position to serve Member States, and it would closely consider the proposals made under various agenda items concerning their security and living and working conditions. A victim of terrorism — and of State terrorism for more than 40 years — Cuba fully understood the suffering caused by the attacks against United Nations staff members, and reaffirmed the need for international cooperation to combat the scourge.

49. Security and stability in developing countries were linked to economic growth and sustainable development; in that regard, the United Nations played a crucial role. More resources should therefore be allocated to development activities, including the appropriations in the regular budget. His delegation was opposed to the financing of a security system with resources from other unrelated sections and programmes in order to carry out arbitrary zero-growth policies which were not backed by the General Assembly and were contrary to the spirit of resolution 41/213 and subsequent resolutions.

50. With respect to the proposals put forward in the Secretary-General's report (A/59/365 and Add.1), his delegation shared the view expressed by the Advisory Committee in the first sentence of paragraph 15 of its report (A/59/539). Furthermore, it would like a more precise idea of the total budget that would be needed for the current biennium, as well as for the next. In fact, estimated expenses for special political missions were not covered, and paragraphs 36 and 43 of document A/59/365/Add.1, for example, suggested that other expenses would be added to the estimates indicated in annex V.

51. His delegation favoured the establishment of a unified management system, but noted that the proposed project seemed to waver between centralization and decentralization, included structures that duplicated existing units, and was not conducive to integration. It was essential to avoid duplication, which was wasteful. It agreed with the Advisory Committee that the security system should place priority on sites other than headquarters locations. It feared that the importance attached to the question of security did not favour the creation of many new posts, including senior posts which seemed to have no justification. It noted the increase in the arrangements for unforeseen and extraordinary expenses. It favoured retaining the cost-sharing system, because it believed that the security and safety of staff members and premises was the collective responsibility, including the financial responsibility, of all organizations in the United Nations system.

52. **Mr. Chun** Yung-woo (Republic of Korea) said that his country shared the Secretary-General's deep concern for the safety of the men and women serving the United Nations around the globe. Providing the best possible safety and security for all United Nations personnel was not only a prerequisite for the successful performance of their duties but also a fundamental obligation of the Secretariat and the Member States. The deteriorating security environment had created an urgent need to strengthen the Organization's security system. His delegation respected the Secretary-General's judgement as to the resources required for restructuring the system. It also supported the basic direction and thrust of his reform plan designed to protect United Nations personnel against new threats.

53. Strengthening the role and the responsibilities of host countries in protecting United Nations personnel and premises imposed a need to review and, if necessary, update the agreements signed with them decades earlier. Additional United Nations resources must be allocated as a matter of priority to high-risk areas where the host countries lacked the means to provide adequate protection. His delegation also supported the proposal to amalgamate the four existing security structures into a single Directorate in order to increase the overall operational efficiency. However, it was not clear why such restructuring required 754 new posts. In any event, in view of its staffing numbers the Directorate should be headed by an official at the Under-Secretary-General or Assistant Secretary-General level.

54. The proposal to create, away from Headquarters, integrated security teams to reinforce the security of

field offices and protect their staff was acceptable, as was the emphasis on the importance of coordination and information-sharing with other organizations of the United Nations system which would continue to manage their own security. The Advisory Committee had noted in that regard that the phasing out of the current cost-sharing arrangements would increase the cost of security to the Member States by the substantial sum of $30 million. His delegation could not take a position on that question without further information. Resource predictability was, of course, a good thing, but the additional costs to the Member States would be worthwhile only if they were translated into enhanced security. If a better partnership with the other organizations of the system and better management of cost-sharing produced savings in the order of $3 million, it might be wise to have second thoughts about phasing out cost-sharing.

55. The investment of additional human and financial resources was indeed inevitable, but there was no substitute for professionalism on the part of security personnel; hence the vital importance of intensive training. Some issues required further examination with a view to ensuring that each step taken would improve security in all the locations where the United Nations was present.

56. **Ms. Adiwoso Asmady** (Indonesia) said that her delegation associated itself with the statement made by the representative of Qatar on behalf of the Group of 77 and China. It was essential to modernize and improve the United Nations security management system by unifying it, for some elements of the system called for urgent review. Such elements included shortage of personnel, limited monitoring and threat-assessment capability, and the system's fragmentation. However, the proposal to merge the existing structures into a new Directorate of Security must be examined closely.

57. If Directorate of Security, which would have more staff than the current system, was to deliver better coordination of security matters, the responsibilities of the various stakeholders must be clearly demarcated and complement each other, and the chain of command must be well designed. The Directorate's personnel would certainly have to have the necessary expertise for reviewing the recommendations made by security officers in the field, who would themselves enjoy the support of the relevant host-country authorities.

58. The coordination among the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes would have to be improved, and in that regard careful thought must precede any move to phase out the cost-sharing arrangements.

59. **Mr. Tal** (Jordan) said that his delegation endorsed the statement made by the representative of Qatar on behalf of the Group of 77 and China. The new situation, in which the Organization was no longer either protected by its flag or simply a peripheral victim of terrorism, made it necessary for the Member States to deal with the issue of the security of the United Nations and its personnel in a responsible, comprehensive and integrated manner. His delegation fully endorsed the reasons cited by the Secretary-General to justify the reform of the Organization's security management system at Headquarters and in the field, for the existing system was cumbersome, lacked sufficient staffing, coordination mechanisms and clear reporting lines and was, at times, ineffective in providing the necessary level of security. That being the case, the Secretary-General's proposals prompted four main comments.

60. First, the Organization must equip itself with the means of obtaining accurate information about the threats and making proper analyses of the likelihood of their realization. Second, the collaboration with host countries must be maintained, formalized and strengthened. Host countries must discharge in a continuous and sustained manner their responsibilities with respect to the protection of the premises and personnel in their territory. Third, the concern to provide the security function with predictable resources was understandable, but all those responsible for that function must shoulder the financial burden for performing it. The cost-sharing arrangements must therefore be maintained but simplified and streamlined in order to ease the burden of their administration. Fourth and last, the proposal to create a new Directorate of Security was a first and important step towards unification of the command structure of the United Nations security services but, while it would establish reporting lines and the division of labour, it would also create a multiplicity of layers and units which might lead to problems that were difficult to foresee. There was a need for a closer look at the relationships between the proposed security bodies. Jordan, which had been in the forefront of the fight against terrorism, believed that only a collective

approach could ensure the safety both of the Member States and of the people whom they delegated to carry out United Nations mandates.

61. **Mr. Terzi** (Turkey) said that his delegation aligned itself with the statement made by the representative of the Netherlands on behalf of the European Union. The Organization was entrusted with increasingly complex, diverse and geographically dispersed tasks, including the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals. It now had to cope with serious problems relating to the security of its premises and personnel which might prevent it from carrying out its activities. The Secretary-General had recalled that truth in his report and had accordingly made the issue his first priority.

62. Three questions arose. Firstly, was there an increasing security threat? Since 1992, 218 civilian staff and several hundred peacekeepers had lost their lives, and three international staff members had been taken hostage just a few days earlier. And the risks could only increase with the expansion of United Nations operations. Secondly, was the current security structure adequate to address the problem? All the United Nations and independent experts who had assessed the structure had concluded that it was weak, fragmented and ineffective and had systemic problems, not least with respect to critical tasks such as policy formulation and threat assessment. Lastly, if the current structure was inadequate, what could be done to solve the problem? The Secretary-General had put forward proposals to that end which had been approved by all the organizations of the system and by the Federation of International Civil Servants' Associations. The proposals were also discussed in an ACABQ report. Despite the differences of opinion among Member States, it was particularly important to establish a unified and integrated management system with clear procedures and well-defined responsibilities which covered, among other things, policy formulation and threat assessment and facilitated both the correct allocation of resources and timely responses to new threats.

63. The situation was urgent and called for swift action. The first need was to agree on the general framework, the principles and the broad structure in order to set the project in motion immediately. The key appointments should be made quickly so that experienced and professional managers could get down to work and in so doing come up with new ideas which would help to fill in the details of the project, if necessary. The crucial importance of the issue for the very existence of the Organization and its Members rendered swift action essential.

64. **Mr. Simancas** (Mexico) said that the question of the security of United Nations personnel was a priority for Mexico, which had worked hard as a member of the Security Council for the adoption of resolution 1502 (2003), which, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General to address the question in all his country-specific reports. His delegation was anxious that decisions should be taken in full knowledge of the facts and therefore regretted the statement in the ACABQ report that the Secretariat acknowledged that it did not yet possess the capability to conduct security threat and risk assessments and timely and comprehensive follow-on planning on either a global or a country-level basis. As a result, the proposed system had been formulated on a piecemeal basis and it had not been made clear whether the requests for material and equipment were based on objective technical standards.

65. His delegation believed, like the Secretary-General himself and other delegations, that the primary responsibility for ensuring the safety and protection of United Nations personnel rested with the host countries. It noted from the annex to the Secretary-General's report the proposed security improvements at the United Nations premises in Mexico City, including the installation of blast resistance film on windows. It was ready to collaborate in that operation with the Secretariat and the field offices, especially with regard to the exchange of information.

66. The host-country agreements must be reviewed and updated without delay. He commended Switzerland for making arrangements to ensure the security of the premises of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and it invited the other host countries to follow the Swiss example.

67. **Mr. Gillerman** (Israel) said that his country attached great importance to the strengthening of security of United Nations staff, premises and infrastructure. Terrorists clearly now believed the Organization to be a legitimate target. The attack on the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad was clearly part of a worldwide trend, and the abduction of the United Nations electoral workers in Afghanistan was another dangerous signpost. Strong and decisive

measures were needed if the Organization was to fulfil its mandate.

68. The Secretary-General's proposal was, as he himself had said, the most important initiative he had ever placed before the General Assembly. His report described the measures that must be taken, principal among them the unification of the various security structures through an integrated directorate; the establishment of a robust central capacity that would allow effective decentralization of security work at the country level; and the strengthening of the security system worldwide. Israel attached particular importance to the creation of a threat and risk assessment capability within the new Directorate of Security and believed the regular budget to be the appropriate funding source for the Secretary-General's initiative. It was to be hoped that, with due account taken of the contributions of ACABQ, the informal consultations would help to find a balance between the urgency of action and the upholding of structural and financial efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The logistics employed towards that goal must be efficient and avoid politicization.

69. Israel lent its strong support to the Secretary-General's initiative and was prepared to offer its experience to the new directorate. Inadequate attention to the security of United Nations field workers would destroy any possibility of the Organization playing an effective role in conflict areas.

70. **Mr. Torres Lépori** (Argentina) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement made by the representative of Qatar on behalf of the Group of 77 and China. Security had become a matter of high priority since the United Nations had become the target of extremists. That unprecedented situation called for an in-depth review of security measures, emphasis on prevention, the development of suitable crisis management and the adoption of a more dynamic approach than in the past. The report of the Secretary-General contained proposals that warranted consideration on the basis of the Advisory Committee's observations and recommendations. The cost-sharing formula had had its uses, but his delegation was prepared to work towards updating it. A long-term perspective for addressing the new challenges posed by security needs must include the establishment of a rigorous framework of responsibility and accountability. The protection of United Nations staff was an objective to which Argentina was deeply attached.

71. **Ms. Baroudi** (Morocco) said that her delegation associated itself with the statement made by the representative of Qatar on behalf of the Group of 77 and China. Any efforts aimed at ensuring the security of the United Nations could not but contribute to the strengthening of international security. Such efforts must not be limited to the perimeter of the premises occupied by the agencies concerned.

72. Her delegation welcomed the creation of a special directorate and hoped that it would bring together all existing security services and so help to harmonize security management in United Nations agencies. It was necessary to ensure the closest possible coordination between the new directorate and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and to address certain specific needs of the host countries. Morocco felt strongly that responsibility for ensuring the security of United Nations personnel lay with those countries and that it should be the subject of legally binding texts.

73. **Ms. Bellamy** (Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund), speaking on behalf of the Executive Committee of the United Nations Development Group, comprising four agencies: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), said that the Group completely endorsed the remarks the Secretary-General had made to the Committee on 1 November on the subject of security. The staff members of the four agencies concerned were talented and committed. They could accept that their work might be difficult and even carried out in hostile conditions, but not that they should be the targets of acts of violence, sometimes murder. Since 1 January 1992, 219 civilian staff members had lost their lives, 83 of them from the four agencies for which she spoke. Since 1994, there had been 81 cases of abduction involving 278 United Nations staff members. The rate of occurrence of violent assault, rape and vehicle hijacking was increasing every year.

74. Following repeated requests to the Secretary-General from the General Assembly, measures had been taken to improve security management and strengthen field protection. Since 2000, several teams

of independent experts had reviewed the existing systems in order to note the shortcomings and propose remedial action. That lengthy and rigorous process had resulted in the Secretary-General's proposal, which had the firm support of the four agencies belonging to the Executive Committee of the United Nations Development Group. The system envisaged would guarantee unified, professional and robust security management. The various components were set out in detail in the documents submitted to Committee members. Inasmuch as they had been developed through a professional and well-thought-out process, it would be pointless to attempt to micro-manage them.

75. The proposed package had a significant cost, but the $97 million requested was a relatively modest sum, given the mandates of the agencies concerned, the importance of the development and emergency programmes, the total staff of over 100,000, plus their families and other dependants, and the field offices in some 160 countries.

76. The four agencies concerned also endorsed the proposal to do away with the cost-sharing arrangements used to fund field security operations to date. The cost entailed in financing security, a sine qua non of United Nations operations, was necessitated in part by the political nature of the Organization and must be part of its core budget. The current arrangements were cumbersome and would leave critical security needs subject to the fluctuations of voluntary contributions. To maintain them would oblige the agencies concerned to cut down on their core activities.

77. As the Secretary-General had pointed out, the time had come to update the United Nations security system. That was the view shared by the staff and by the specialists who had reviewed the issue at length.

78. **Mr. Kramer** (Canada) observed that numerous delegations subscribed to the idea that all the parties concerned with field security must be involved in the system and that, to that end, the principle of cost-sharing must be maintained; otherwise the funds and programmes might be tempted to use savings to maintain or establish different systems. He would like to hear Ms. Bellamy's position on that point.

79. **Ms. Bellamy** (Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund), replying to the question put by the representative of Canada, said that the cornerstone of the field security system must be the security management team, whose members, being on the spot, were best acquainted with the situation, as the Secretary-General had acknowledged in his report. It was essential to take that team's views fully into account. It was recommended that the team should meet on a regular basis, that all its members should have received security training and that the head of the team should have experience of emergency operations. The matter of funding the activities was relatively less important. That being so, the agencies that belonged to the Executive Committee of the United Nations Development Group were firmly convinced that the costs of security must be drawn on the United Nations regular budget. For their part, they would continue to incur the expenditure needed to protect their staff. They had not established parallel field structures, but collaborated closely by exchanging information and rendering services to one another. They depended on donors to finance their security expenditure and if those donors did not respond to their appeals, they had no choice but to take the necessary funds from core resources. They had an obligation to protect their staff.

80. **Ms. Bertini** (Under-Secretary-General for Management) observed that the establishment of a reliable security system had met with the general approval of Committee members. The Organization was in fact morally responsible for protecting its staff. She would reply during the informal consultations to the questions concerning the various components of the Secretary-General's proposal, which he himself considered to be his most important since becoming head of the Secretariat.

Agenda item 118: Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (*continued*) (A/58/785; A/59/359)

81. **Mr. Kramer** (Canada), speaking also on behalf of Australia and New Zealand, said that the annual report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) amply illustrated once again how important the Office's independent work was for Member States' confidence that their contributions were well used. However, there was a need to improve the mechanisms for the systematic follow-up of the recommendations made, many of which had not been acted upon.

82. The OIOS internal audit should expand the attention it devoted to safety and security issues. The degree of non-compliance found in UNHCR field

operations was disturbing. Information should be supplied on how that situation would be remedied.

83. Information technology was a high-risk area. It had been disheartening to read in the Office's report of the continuation of piecemeal approaches to the development of systems in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, a sign that the impediments to the formulation and implementation of a system-wide information technology strategy had not been overcome. The delegations on whose behalf he was speaking had already made known their disappointment at the slow pace at which OIOS had developed its audit capacity in that field.

84. The internal audit of peacekeeping operations also needed to be developed. The problems relating to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) illustrated the importance of proper control mechanisms. It would be interesting to know what OIOS had learned about how accountability worked in such missions and whether it conducted similar work in special political missions.

85. It was essential that the outcomes of investigations should be acted upon. He would like to have further details on that subject, especially on the steps being taken to address the perception found in the integrity survey that accountability was unevenly distributed. He would also like to be apprised of the finding of the investigation of allegations of the sexual exploitation of young girls by military mission members in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

86. He thanked the Office for its much improved programme performance report for the financial period 2002-2003, for its contribution to the improvement of conference management and for its work on regional economic commissions. The Office's observations about the contribution made by regional advisers would be helpful to delegations when they came to examine the technical cooperation programme.

87. The Secretary-General was proposing to entrust a comprehensive independent review of OIOS to an independent panel, but had not made it clear exactly what he had in mind or what problem needed to be solved. It could be useful to examine the way in which fundamental functions such as internal audit and investigation were done and the resources needed. However, there should be a more focused formulation of a possible review.

88. An independent review should also address the adequacy of the manner in which OIOS findings and recommendations were acted upon. The Office reported directly to the General Assembly. It was hard to contemplate change in that element outside a context of broader governance reform that would ensure that internal oversight findings and recommendations would be acted upon systematically. The priority of the reform should be to enhance transparency and strengthen the Office's independence. The United States delegation had outlined interesting ideas on those issues.

89. **Mr. Xudong** Sun (China) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement made by the representative of Qatar on behalf of the Group of 77 and China. He commended the Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services and his team on the excellent work they had done over the years. Between 1 July 2003 and 30 June 2004, the Office had issued 1,515 recommendations for improving internal oversight and removing underlying obstacles to efficiency, of which 52.3 per cent had already been implemented. Of the 473 critical recommendations, 33 per cent had been for improved administration and management, and 49 per cent for improved operational effectiveness and efficiency. It was to be hoped that they would be carefully studied and implemented by the departments concerned as soon as possible.

90. In paragraph 8 of its report, OIOS stated that those recommendations should afford the Organization savings or recoveries totalling $16.4 million and that recoveries during the reporting period had totalled $26.6 million. The average amount of annual savings recommended by OIOS over the past 10 years had averaged $31 million, a precious gift to Member States.

91. The Office had highlighted many weaknesses in procurement controls. One alarming situation, described in paragraph 22 of its report was that, owing to the contractor's shortages, in most MONUC contingents stocks of combat rations had been below the 14-day requirement. The Secretariat should clarify the measures taken to ensure stricter implementation of the rations contract.

92. There were also weaknesses in the financial management of peacekeeping operations. As pointed out in paragraphs 34 and 35 of the report, the MONUC daily troop-reporting system and the system used to calculate monthly payments were unreliable. His

delegation was proposing to request information in writing from the Secretariat on the daily troop-strength and attendance record for any given month before 1 July 2003 on a random basis, and for a detailed report on areas of financial management that needed improvement. He was dismayed that the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea had been the victim of a $1.1 million fraud involving abuse of the telephone system. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations must enjoin the Mission to disclose the exact amount recovered thus far.

93. The self-evaluation carried out by OIOS spoke for itself and pointed out the future direction of its work. Its recommendations would help to improve the functioning of the Organization and should, in principle, be reduced over time.

94. **Ms. Zobrist Rentenar** (Switzerland) commended the Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services and his staff, who had taken various initiatives over the years to reorganize and strengthen OIOS. Section III of its annual report contained a very useful self-assessment of its activities, undertaken with a view to assisting the General Assembly in its five-year evaluation of the Office's activities. The Office should implement those proposals concerning internal management which did not need approval by the General Assembly, on the understanding that the others would be discussed. The Office's budgetary independence needed to be strengthened, the term of office of its head extended, and a coordination mechanism set up to review the status of implementation of oversight recommendations.

95. That latter issue was of particular importance to her delegation. Many United Nations agencies and governmental organizations had an oversight or audit committee to ensure that oversight resources were efficiently used and that the recommendations of oversight bodies were implemented by programme managers. Those committees also served as issue-resolution forums to reconcile differences between managers and auditors. They reported directly to the head of the organization and most were composed of high-ranking officers of management who were usually not major oversight clients.

96. Should it be considered preferable not to set up a new structure, the task could be entrusted to the Accountability Panel. Established in 2000 to ensure that the Secretariat addressed the findings of its oversight review bodies from a systemic perspective, it had not met since the autumn of 2001. Its mandate was broader in scope than that of an oversight committee, since it also dealt with questions relating to the delegation of authority and the administration of justice.

97. Her delegation was not convinced of the usefulness of entrusting an in-depth review of the functioning of OIOS to an outside panel of experts, as the Secretary-General had suggested. The United Nations Board of Auditors and the United States General Accounting Office had already carried out that type of evaluation in the past. It would also have been preferable to have received the proposal well in advance of the time the General Assembly was to take up the review of the mandate of OIOS. However, her delegation would not oppose such a study once it obtained further details on the terms of reference and composition of the panel. Another of the panel's tasks could be to look into the question of an appropriate follow-up mechanism.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.